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Introduction 
 A surrogate mother is a woman who agrees to become pregnant and then carry to 
term and give birth to a child for whom other, designated, individuals will serve as social 
parents. Sometimes the surrogate is also a genetic mother, but in other cases the child is 
genetically unrelated to the surrogate and genetically related to one or both of the 
intended social parents. Many jurisdictions presently allow individuals to enter 
commercial surrogacy contracts (such as India, Russia and some of United States), while 
others restrict surrogacy arrangements to so-called altruistic surrogacy – that is, cases 
when the surrogate carries a child for another person – usually a relative – out of non-
economic interests. Yet other jurisdictions (such as Quebec in Canada) prohibit all 
surrogacy, or at least rule them as void. Further, there is the question of the 
enforceability of surrogacy contracts: some jurisdictions do not attempt to enforce 
surrogacy contracts, such that, if and when the surrogate mother changes her mind and 
decides to keep the baby she is legally free do to so. (Perhaps after repaying whatever 
fees she has already received from the couple who employed her and, possibly, various 
pregnancy-related costs that the couple has supported.) 
 Whether or not surrogacy contracts should exist at all and, if yes, whether they should 
be enforceable or not will obviously turn on many questions. So far, most of the 
literature on the normative status of surrogacy discussed whether surrogacy is 
intrinsically exploitative or otherwise harmful to the surrogate and whether existing 
surrogacy practices, in the real world, are in fact exploitative of, or otherwise harming, 
surrogates. But a different set of equally important questions bearing on the matter 
regard the way in which individuals acquire a moral right to rear a child, and whether, 
once they acquire this right, they can transfer it to other individuals at will1. 
1 In this paper I use “right”, unqualified, to refer to legal rights. I always make it explicit when I refer to moral rights 
– and most of the discussion here is about moral rights. I assume that the existence of a moral right to x ought to be an 
important basis for a legal right to x, but that the translation may not be always straightforward. 
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 This article engages with the last group of questions in order to make a contribution 
to the debate concerning the legitimacy of surrogacy contracts and their enforceability. I 
argue that pregnancy is normatively relevant to the question of who should have the 
moral right to rear a particular child. At least unless other people are highly likely to 
make better parents for the child in question and are willing to parent her or him, a 
gestational mother acquires the moral right to parent in virtue of having gestated the 
child. Moreover, the reasons for holding the right are such that the right cannot be 
transferred on to other individuals. The moral right acquired by the gestational mother 
is, of course, defeasible. As I will explain, the moral right is nullified if the woman in 
question fails to make a sufficiently good parent to her child; and the right does not exist 
in the first place – at least not in virtue of pregnancy – in case there is no mutual 
attachment between the mother and the newborn1. If surrogates acquire a moral right to 
rear the children they gestate in virtue of an attachment formed during gestation, then 
surrogacy contracts ought not to be enforceable because their enforcement would 
violate a moral right of the surrogate. And if part of what explains this moral right is the 
newborn's own attachment to her or his gestational mother, then the surrogate's moral 
right to parent cannot, in principle be transferred to a third party and therefore 
surrogacy contracts ought to be always seen as void.  
 Some surrogates do indeed refuse to relinquish the child they have gestated. When 
the couple who had hired the surrogate continues to desire to become the social parent 
of the child custody battles are likely to ensue, and different jurisdictions will rule 
differently on such cases. Sometimes the law is on the side of the surrogate in 
acknowledging her as the legal mother of the child (which in turn may or may not result 
in custody rights), but – again – in different jurisdictions the reason for granting custody 
to the surrogate may be very different. 
 In 1988, in one of the first surrogacy cases to be brought to court in the United States, 
the surrogate, Mary Beth Whitehead, was eventually acknowledged as the legal mother 
of baby she gestated (“Baby M”) after being hired by the couple William and Elizabeth 
Stern (Sanger 2007). Baby M was conceived by artificial insemination and William Stern 
was her genetic father. (Custody rights were ultimately granted to the father, William 
Stern, based on the principle of the best interest of the child.) Importantly, in this case 
1 There might be other cases when the gestational mother does not have, all things considered, the moral right to 
rear the child she gestated. I explore the possibility that the moral right to parent a particular child is held by the best 
available parent (and how this relates to being a gestational mother) in Gheaus (2015b). 
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Mary Beth Whitehead has been an egg donor as well as a gestational mother, and her 
genetic relatedness to the child is likely to have influenced the decision. Indeed, in some 
jurisdictions the most important criterion used to decide disputes over parental status is 
genetic relatedness1. 
 In other cases, however, genetic relatedness need not play a role in the decision to 
grant parental rights to the surrogate. In a more recent UK case, a surrogate who 
gestated a baby for a couple, and who has changed her mind concerning the 
relinquishing of the child, gained custody in virtue of the attachment that has been 
created between gestational mother and her newborn during pregnancy. In the words of 
the judge who decided the case, Mr. Justice Baker: “there is a clear attachment between 
mother and daughter. To remove her from her mother's care would cause a measure of 
harm. The natural process of carrying and giving birth to a baby creates an attachment 
which may be so strong that the surrogate mother finds herself unable to give up the 
child.”2 The surrogate's very inability – or, more likely, unwillingness – to give up the 
child is part and parcel of what makes the surrogate more likely (other things equal) to 
best serve the fulfilment of the child's emotional needs. 
 The reasoning of Justice Baker, I assume, is sound – and the following analysis of the 
normative importance of pregnancy is meant to unpack this belief. 
 
How pregnancy is normatively importantly – a phenomenological approach3 
 There are two general features of the majority of pregnancies that support a moral 
right of would-be adequate mothers to keep and rear their birth babies. First, 
pregnancies involve a variety of costs – physical, psychological, social and financial. Most 
of these costs can only be shouldered by pregnant women and, to some extent, their 
supportive partner if they have any. Second, and related, during pregnancy many, 
perhaps most, expectant mothers form a poignantly embodied, but also emotional, 
intimate relationship with their foetus. The two features are related because this 
relationship is fostered by bearing mothers’ willingness to take on the costs of 
pregnancy and from the actual experience of its burdens. A strictly physicalist approach 
will say that the attachment between the pregnant woman and the foetus she carries 
1 For a philosophical analysis, and defence, of this see Richards (2010). 
2  "CW v NT and another [2011] EWHC 33”, Family Law Week blog, 2011 archive. Available online at: 
http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed79071 (Accessed on the 5th of April 2016.) 
3 This section draws substantially on Gheaus (2012) 
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results from oxytocin, a substance considered responsible for bonding and which is 
secreted during pregnancy. Whether one takes the phenomenological approach or the 
phsysicalist approach to analyzing bonding during pregnancy might make a normative 
difference, but not in this context. A physicalist might argue, for example, that we could, 
and in some contexts should, use oxytocin to help foster the emotional relationship 
between non-birth parents and babies. But this would not affect the present argument, 
which says that, one way or another, pregnancy itself fosters this relationship and hence 
taking babies away from their birth parents is morally wrong. 
 The two features of pregnancy discussed here can – together with other conditions1 – 
ground a moral right to keep one’s birth baby – right which is simultaneously grounded 
in the interest of the parent and in the interest of the child. 
 Work on the phenomenology of pregnancy is very helpful for understanding both the 
numerous costs that pregnancy involves and the mechanisms through which it helps 
create an incipient intimate relationship between the foetus and the pregnant mother 
and her partner, if the latter is sufficiently involved. In exploring these claims, I rely on 
work done by several feminists and I refer, in particular, to Amy Mullin’s book 
Reconceiving Pregnancy and Childcare. 
 The costs of pregnancy are varied: physical, emotional, social and financial. They 
consist in  the actual pain of childbearing and childbirth, in pregnant women’s reduced 
autonomy, in the health risks women take in order to carry their babies, in the worries 
about the mother’s and the baby’s health and in the daunting risk of miscarriage2. 
 The physical burdens of pregnancy have a significant effect on many pregnant 
women’s ability to carry on with life as usual: “Fatigue, high blood pressure, excessive 
water retention in one’s hands and feet, nausea and vomiting, an inability to carry heavy 
objects, and other common symptoms of pregnancy do involve suffering and affect a 
pregnant woman’s ability to carry out her daily tasks, whether in paid employment, 
domestic work, childcare or interactions with friends and family, regardless of how 
accommodating her environment may be.” (Mullin 2005, 64). Some of the most 
important burdens of pregnancy result from the extent and pace of change undergone 
by pregnant women. Mullin’s book gives a very vivid sense of the many physical changes 
1 I believe, but cannot fully argue here, that these conditions have to do with the would-be-mother satisfying certain 
criteria for parental adequacy. 
2 On the serious harms that a miscarriage can entail for the pregnant woman see Ann J. Cahill, Kathryn J.Norlock, 
and Byron J. Stoyles (eds.) (2015). 
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undergone by pregnant women: “in visual acuity, pigment of her skin, the onset of 
rashes, nausea, heartburn, raised blood pressure, increased congestion, difficulty 
catching her breath, swollen hands and feet” (Mullin, 2005, 39). Many of these are 
relatively minor, but together they can entail significant pain and disruption of one’s 
normal life. These changes are experienced by the vast majority of pregnant women, and 
often contribute to a distinctive sense of losing control over one’s life and diminished 
ability to pursue other projects and interests during pregnancy as well as during 
recovery from childbirth. As Mullin notes, “at no other time will an otherwise healthy 
adult undergo such widespread, rapid and undesired change in the shape and size of her 
body, in the way she moves, eats and sleeps.” (Mullin, 2005, 67). 
 Many pregnant women also pay behavioural costs in the limitation of what they can 
eat and drink, the recreational drugs they can take and the sports and other physical 
activities which they can pursue. There are social costs to pay, such as patronising and 
uninvited familiarity: pregnant women are often “told that nothing they can do could be 
more important than their job of bringing a child to life.” (Mullin, 2005, 40). Generally, 
pregnancy alters the expecting parents’ relationships with their immediate family, 
friends, co-workers and, when the pregnancy is visible, even with strangers, in 
uncontrollable ways. Arguably, not all these changes count as costs, since in some cases 
pregnant women develop or strengthen welcomed relationships, based, for instance, on 
complicity, with other parents. But many of the changes are undesirable and, 
importantly for the present argument, many of the desirable changes are based on the 
assumption that the pregnant women/parents will carry on parenting their birth baby. 
Moreover, the costs of pregnancy would actually be higher if bearing mothers did not 
know whether they will be legally entitled to keep their birth baby. A frequent 
consolation given to pregnant women is that becoming a parent “is worth all the trouble 
and pain”. 
 Finally, gestational mothers have to shoulder specific emotional burdens such as fear 
of miscarriage and the anxiety of deciding whether to continue a pregnancy with 
significant health risks. A pregnant woman “needs to come to terms with her welcoming 
of a creature who is already transforming her body, her social interactions, and her 
habits, who will always radically transform her life and about whom she knows virtually 
nothing.” (Mullin, 2005, 43). While they cannot share all these costs, involved partners 
typically can and do share many of them. They often are the main source of emotional, 
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practical and financial support of their pregnant partner: they can accompany her to 
medical visits and support her during childbirth, share and try to soothe her worries, 
relieve her of some of her regular work and serve as an often needed interface between 
her and the insufficiently accommodating outer world. 
 Some, but not all the costs of pregnancy can be socially prevented or mitigated – I 
elaborate on this point in what follows. Pregnancy often involves specific benefits as 
well as costs. The benefits and joys of pregnancy however do not cancel out the costs, 
and do not turn pregnancy into an intrinsically desirable experience. Certain benefits of 
pregnancy, such as the increased attention and care that pregnant women often receive, 
are meant to alleviate its costs: if pregnancy did not involve specific costs, the benefits 
would not exist either (in this respect as well, pregnancy is similar to illness and 
disability). Other benefits of pregnancy, such as the joyous anticipation of the baby, are 
only valuable given the assumption that one carries a baby one will keep and raise. 
Importantly, the most salient positive aspects of pregnancy are conditional on expecting 
that, at the end of one’s pregnancy, one will become a parent. If, contrary to the claims I 
advance in this section, pregnancy turned out to be intrinsically valuable, or if the 
benefits of pregnancy outweighed its burdens without being parasitic on an expectation 
that birth mothers will have the moral right to keep their babies, then one pillar of my 
argument for a moral right to raise the baby one has gestated would disappear. 
 Certain experiences of pregnancy, such as fragmented sleep and disrupted life 
patterns, may, precisely due to their hardship, prepare bearing parents to better care for 
their babies. Some authors think that pregnancy helps prepare mothers – and, when 
they are closely involved with pregnancy, their partners – to be ready for the major 
changes brought about by childrearing (Levesque-Lopman, 1983, 256). If this is correct, 
it means that, other things equal, birth mothers are better prepared to take care of a 
baby and so that there is a child interest in being raised by somebody who is also a birth 
mother. The burdens of pregnancy then generate a child-based reason for allocating the 
moral right to parent particular babies, alongside with a parental interest in raising 
one’s gestated child. 
 There is a certain similarity between justifying a moral right to parent by appeal to 
the costs of pregnancy and the libertarian – or proprietarian – argument according to 
which parents have some kind of ownership over children because children result from 
their parents’ labour (Narveson 2002). By contrast, I do not argue that the costs of 
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pregnancy, including the efforts it requires, entail anything as strong as ownership 
rights. 
 The argument from the costs of pregnancy could provide some justification for a 
moral right to keep and raise the baby one has gestated, but it may perhaps be 
overridden by other reasons – such as considerations of race or gender fairness1. Appeal 
to the costs of pregnancy alone cannot exclude legitimate baby shuffling between all 
bearing parents: the burdens of pregnancy entitle potentially adequate parents, who just 
gave birth, to parent a baby, but not necessarily the baby they gave birth to. Similarly, it 
is important to note that an argument appealing to the costs of the pregnancy alone, if 
that worked, would ground a moral right to rear that would be easily transferable on to 
third parties, thereby lending legitimacy to surrogacy contracts. If gestational mothers 
acquired the moral right to rear their birth baby merely in virtue of the costs of the 
pregnancy – thanks, perhaps, to the labour they put in the process – there would be no 
obvious reason against an entitlement to sell this right to another person. 
 A second feature of pregnancy, the fact that it facilitates the creation of an intimate 
relationship between the bearing mother and the future baby, does the main theoretical 
work. The two features of pregnancy – its significant costs, and its ability to provide a 
context for forging an intimate relationship with the future baby – are closely related. 
Because children come into existence through gestation, pregnant women and, 
sometimes, their supporting partners have to invest a significant amount of resources 
into having birth children; this is an often conscious, intentional process, akin to other 
projects in which people engage: it contains much anticipation and planning, thinking 
and hoping, imagination and projection. Granted, in the case of surrogate mothers some 
of these psychological processes may be absent: if the gestational mother does not 
expect to rear the child she may specifically try not to engage in any anticipation and 
planning, thinking and hoping. It is however not clear that it is possible to avoid any 
such engagement; surrogates, too, may undergo – albeit involuntarily, and possibly 
unconsciously – some anticipation, hoping and projection. 
 Through their bodily connection with the baby and their various psychological 
investments, pregnant women normally build a relationship with their future baby, 
relationship which is sometimes highly emotional and already quite developed at birth. 
1 Because the question of who has the moral right to parent a particular child has to be an answer to an all-things-
considered question. For the case in favour of the baby lottery see Gheaus (2012) and Earl (2015), work in progress. 
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Bearing mother and their newborns already share a common history including 
numerous embodied common experiences (“you kicked me on the 1st of March”,”you 
made me worry”, “you made me cry with happiness”). The fact that the body plays such 
a central part in pregnancy, makes pregnancy a uniquely privileged context for 
developing a bond that is at the same time physical and imaginative with the future 
child. Caroline Whitbeck has gone as far as to argue that people’s affection towards their 
own children, often explained by reference to a maternal/parental “instinct”, is actually 
rooted in bodily experiences: “parental affection or attachment is influenced by 
experience, and this experience is not confined to socialization experience but includes, 
in a large measure, bodily experiences that are the same cross-culturally; i.e. all women 
have special bodily experiences that are likely to enhance those feelings, attitudes and 
fantasies, which induce people to generally care for their infants.” (Whitbeck, 1984, 
191). These experiences include pregnancy, labour, childbirth and post-partum 
recovery, which are unique to the bearing mother. Whitbeck concludes that, although 
the maternal ‘instinct’ is itself a myth, biology – though embodied experience – plays a 
very important role in creating a bound between newborns and their mothers. This 
argument might be soon verifiable, when enough people will be around whose bearing 
mothers are different from their genetic mothers. If true, then biology turns out to play 
an important role in parent-children relationships thanks to the biological processes of 
parenthood, independent of genetic connections. 
 Like in the case of paying the costs of pregnancy, pregnant women’s supporting 
partners are capable of being direct participants in the process of creating a relationship 
with the baby during pregnancy. With the help of medical technology they can see the 
foetus and hear its heartbeat as early as the bearing mother; during the last stages of 
pregnancy they can feel the baby, talk to it and be heard by it. Just like the mother, they 
can experience the fears, hopes and fantasies triggered by the growing foetus. 
 The phenomenology of pregnancy does not show that all pregnancies generate 
intimate relationships between bearing mothers and their newborns. It only shows that 
pregnancy can, and it is likely to, lead to bonding; the likelihood is very significant, since 
bonding can happen even if the pregnant woman knows she will not be permitted to 
keep the baby, as we know from cases of surrogate mothers who developed a strong 
attachment to their unborn, and then newborn, baby. Bonding during pregnancy 
provides a very solid reason why allocating babies to different social parents would 
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likely destroy already existing intimate relationships between newborns and their 
bearing parents. 
 The fact that the relationship with one’s future child starts during pregnancy provides 
the missing step in the justification that some philosophers provided in favour of a 
moral right to keep and raise the baby one has gestated. The same fact of attachment 
created in the context of pregnancy provides an answer to the more general question of 
how to determine the moral right to parent a particular baby. (The answer is general, 
but not universal: in some cases the gestational mother will have died at birth, or be 
unwilling to exercise her moral right to rear the child she has given birth to. In these 
cases considerations other than an existing attachment will determine who has the 
moral right to rear the child.) Some philosophers who think that all adults who would 
make adequate parents have a moral right to become social parents – most importantly, 
Ferdinand Shoeman (1980) and Harry Brighouse an Adam Swift (2006; 2014) – have 
argued that it is impermissible to disrupt already established intimate relationships 
between parents and children. The reasons for this have do do both with parents’ and 
with children’s welfare. But no reason was provided why such relationships are 
permitted to develop in the first place – especially if other individuals may be willing to 
serve as the social parents of the child in case. My account of the normative value of 
pregnancy fills this gap: If the same process which brings babies into the world is also 
generating their first intimate relationships adults, relationships between birth parents 
and their babies need no justification: they are already there from the beginning.  
 It is important, to this analysis, to add the perspective of the baby, who also usually 
bonds with its mother whose voice, heartbeat etc., can recognise during the last phase of 
gestation (DeCasper and Fifer 1980; Beauchemin et al. 2011)1. That the newborn, too, is 
usually attached to the gestational mother – as far as we can tell, and as far a newborn 
can be said to be attached – provides an additional, and child-centred justification, for 
the moral right to parent the baby one has gestated. 
 In conclusion, the particular way in which we come into existence is essential for 
determining who has the moral right to rear us. If we all came into the world in 
laboratories, created by scientists, there would be little reason for granting a right to 
rear us to the people who provided the genetic material2. Indeed, elsewhere I argued 
1 I am grateful to Jake Earl for bringing these articles to my attention. 
2 I argue for this at length in Gheaus (2015a). 
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that there are reasons of fairness for redistributing babies between all potential 
adequate parents and, in certain social contexts a “baby shuffling” would help tackle 
historical, and deeply entrenched associations between race or gender and advantage 
(Gheaus 2012). 
 To answer this challenge, I offered an account of how people acquire the right to 
parent a particular baby. One element of such an account is provided by the existence of 
a moral right to keep and rear the baby that one has gestated. If, at the moment of birth, 
adequate gestational mothers (and sometimes their involved partners) have already 
paid significant costs for becoming parents, and, partly in virtue of this process, have 
developed an incipient intimate relationship with the baby, then they are more entitled 
than other, equally good, prospective parents to parent the baby they have borne. This 
difference between adequate gestational mothers and other adequate prospective 
parents can provide the necessary justification for translating a fundamental moral right 
to be a parent in general (as defended by Shoeman, Brighouse and Swift) into a moral 
right of gestational mothers to parent their birth baby. 
 
Conclusions 
 How exactly can adults acquire a moral right to parent a particular child is a very 
controversial question, which this short article did not attempt to settle1. The available 
options include appeal to the interests of the child, appeal to the interests of the adults 
who wish to become social parents and appeal to both sets of interests. Here I argued 
that the facts of pregnancy – that is, its inherent costs and the high likelihood that 
pregnancy is a context where the gestational mother and her foetus are forming a 
mutual attachment – indicate that gestational mothers are very likely to hold a pro tanto 
moral right to parent their newborns on a variety of accounts of how one acquires the 
moral right to parent. (A notable exception is the account according to which it is one's 
contribution of genetic material that justifies the holding of the moral right to parent. 
This is a very influential account – both in popular morality and in legal practice – yet, I 
think, also very implausible2.) 
 Certainly, gestational mothers do not always have the moral right to parent their 
birth child, because pregnancy does not in itself confer the right: rather, the right is held 
1 For a helpful discussion on this see Swift and Brighouse (2014). 
2 As I argue for this at length in Gheaus (2015a) 
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by gestational mothers in virtue of the attachment they usually form with the baby, and 
this attachment does not always exist. Moreover, other circumstances may defeat the 
moral right – as in cases when, for example, the gestational mother would not make a 
sufficiently good parent. 
 But law is, necessarily, a blunt instrument that cannot take into account all the 
normatively relevant features of every case it covers. If a gestational mother's right is 
not usually defeated, then surrogacy contracts ought not to be enforced against the 
gestational mother's wish to parent the child herself (unless special circumstances, like 
those mentioned above, apply.) Moreover, since the right is held in virtue of an 
attachment that is mutual, and because this attachment serves the interest of the 
newborn, the right cannot be transferred at will to other people who would wish to 
function as social parents of the child in question. This indicates that surrogacy contracts 
are illegitimate, and therefore void. 
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